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1Abstract
In this paper we analyse market co-movements during the global nancial
crisis. Using high frequency data and accounting for market microstructure
noise and non-synchronous trading, interdependencies between diering as-
set classes such as equity, FX, xed income, commodity and energy securi-
ties are quantied. To this end multivariate realised kernels and GARCH
models are employed. We nd that during the current period of market
dislocations and times of increased risk aversion, assets have become more
correlated when applying these intra-day measures. FX pairs seemingly lead
the other variables, but commodities remain entirely unaected.
Keywords: Financial crisis, high frequency data, kernel based estimation
JEL Classication Numbers: C32, E44, G01
21 Introduction
The subprime crisis and the following credit crunch which began in the second
half of 2007 has been characterised by the transmission of nancial shocks across
various markets and by interlinkages between and co-movement of diering as-
set classes. The current market dislocations were initially triggered by a credit
event, namely a shock to the U.S. housing market caused by cheap credit and a
subsequent reversal of interest rates and falling house prises. Through the securi-
tisation process by the disintermediated banking system this shock was amplied
and spread across diering assets, leading to disruption of the interbank money,
commercial paper, foreign exchange and credit markets. Furthermore, these ef-
fects, driven by increased levels of risk aversion, were not limited to the U.S. but
aected markets in most developed and emerging market economies.
Due to the severity of the crisis an increasing body of literature has emerged in
this area, such as Frank et al. (2008) who provide a detailed overview of the
increased transmission of liquidity shocks across U.S. nancial markets. This is
also related to existing work on nancial contagion which ourished following the
Asian Crisis. The identication of channels of shock transmission across countries
is, for instance, discussed in Dungey, Fry, Gonzalez-Hermosillo and Martin (2005),
Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2000) and Pericoli and Sbacria (2003). Changes
in conditional correlations between asset returns during the crisis are examined
for structural breaks by Forbes and Rigobon (2002), King, Sentana and Wadhwani
(1994), King and Wadhwani (1990) and Caporale, Cippollini and Spagnolo (2005).
3This paper extends the empirical literature along several dimensions. Unlike in
the aforementioned studies, high frequency data are exploited for a wide range of
diering asset classes, such as equity, FX, commodities, energy and xed income
securities, whilst accounting for market microstructure noise and non-synchronous
trading. This allows for the analysis of realised volatility for these variables dur-
ing the crisis based on an intra-day measure, thus broadening existing work on
equities. Furthermore, changes in interdependencies between markets are quanti-
ed, whereby information loss by merely employing daily returns is avoided. This
question is especially of importance during the current market conditions as it can
help identify aected asset classes and evaluate whether these market dislocations
are indeed systemic. Also, it is essential for investors in the context of portfolio
diversication during times of widespread market illiquidity. Finally, the realised
covariance estimates are combined with daily data within a multivariate GARCH
framework in order to improve the explanatory power of these volatility models
across a wide range of assets.
It has been argued that the emergence of new transmission mechanisms of nan-
cial shocks and the increased co-movements of assets following the onset of the
subprime crisis is due to excess liquidity in markets and portfolio reoptimisation.
Concerning the latter, hedge funds holding asset-backed securities and other struc-
tured products have been burdened by increased margin requirements, driven in
turn by greater market volatility. As a consequence they attempted to ooad the
more liquid parts of their portfolios in order to meet these margin calls and also
respond to redemptions by investors. As argued by Khadani and Lo (2007), quan-
titatively driven hedge funds were especially engaged in liquidation sales across
4dierent asset classes such as through the unwind of carry trades. This ight to
both liquidity and transparency by investors increased demand for assets such as
xed income and gold securities, which is reected by their recent price develop-
ments and their respective trading volumes during the crisis.
In this paper we present evidence supporting this argumentation. Increased corre-
lations across a wide range of assets are found during the current nancial crisis,
compared to those from the pre-crisis period. It is shown that FX pairs moved
approximately 6 months prior to the emergence of any market dislocations, thus
implying their potential as early indicators of future turbulence. Furthermore,
xed income securities became more correlated amongst each other and with cur-
rencies. Interdependence between risk aversion measures such as the VIX index
and gold also became more pronounced. Finally, despite simultaneous increases in
the price levels of commodities, we do not nd evidence of any co-movement when
measured at an intra-daily frequency.
The outline of this paper is as followed. In section 2 we briey discuss the data
and potential linkages between diering asset classes during the nancial crisis.
In section 3 the econometric methodology is provided, followed by the results of
the realised (kernel based) volatility and cross-correlation analysis in sections 4
and 5, respectively. In section 6 a recent strand of literature is explored, whereby
the realised covariances are combined with daily data for estimation within a
multivariate GARCH framework. Finally, section 7 concludes.
52 Data and interlinkages between variables
As outlined in the introduction, this paper provides a detailed analysis of the
realised volatility of assets across equity, FX, xed income, commodity and energy
markets during the ongoing global nancial crisis. Furthermore, potential changes
in the co-movements between these securities are quantied by providing estimates
of realised correlations, whilst accounting for non-synchronous trading and market
microstructure noise.
2.1. Data description
The historical market data are obtained from the commercial providers TickData
and Taq Data, whereby the former have cleaned them by ltering for misreporting
and decimal errors.1 The sample spans January 3rd 2006 until September 31st
2008, such that it includes a control period before the onset of the subprime cri-
sis and ends after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Opening and closing hours
dier across asset classes, ranging from 7:20 for FX and xed income futures to
16:00 for the VIX index and the Exchange Traded Funds. All securities are traded
on either the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), New York Mercantile Exchange
(NYMEX), Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) or on the Chicago Board of Trade
(CBOT), whereby dierences in the respective time zones have been corrected.
This heterogeneity with regard to trading hours does provide challenges for the
realised correlation analysis below, and will be discussed further.
In this paper mainly futures are used in order to achieve consistency across as-
1An overview of the variable names, their respective abbreviations, sources and trading loca-
tions can be found in Table 4 in the appendix.
6sets as well as ensuring sucient market liquidity. Here an auto-roll strategy is
adopted by which the roll-over date is determined by when the daily tick volume
of the back-month contract exceeds that of the current front-month contract. In
the appendix the closing prices of these variables are reported.2 With regard to
xed income securities both the Eurodollar and the 10 year Treasury note futures
contracts are included. The motivation for this is their inverse pricing relative to
interest rates, in addition to their demand being related to investor risk aversion
and preference for liquid and transparent assets. As it can be seen from Figure 5,
prices for both these securities increased signicantly during the onset of the crisis
in the second half of 2007 and have remained at this elevated level since.
Concerning FX variables, $U.S. vs Australian Dollar (AUD hereafter), Swiss Franc
(CHF), Euro (EUR) and Japanese Yen (JPY) futures are used. From the begin-
ning of 2006 until early 2008 the $U.S. depreciated signicantly against these
major currencies, after which it experienced a relative rebound as the nancial
crisis spread to other markets.
Rising commodity prices received much attention in 2008 with focus on whether
their respective sharp increases were driven by economic fundamentals or rather by
speculative forces. Towards the end of the sample period, these price movements
are reversed for the corn, cattle, soy beans and cotton futures.
Measures of risk aversion in nancial markets are included in the form of a gold
2The Exchange Traded Funds for the energy (XLE), technology (XLK) and health care (XLV)
sectors have been omitted. Their respective price movements are very similar to those of the
Industrial Sector SPDR (XLI)
7futures contract and the VIX index, which is a function of the implied volatility
of S&P 500 index options. During the beginning of the crisis in the second half
of 2007 the former increased signicantly and eventually peaked at a historical
high in excess of $1000 following the rescue of Bear Stearns in March 2008. The
VIX on the other hand, exhibited a number of sharp upwards movements, most
noticeably during the Chinese stock market correction in February 2007, during
the beginning of market dislocations in the summer of the same year and nally
during the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
In this paper stock markets are proxied by Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), which
mimic the performance of an underlying industry index. These entities are similar
to mutual funds but dier in that continuous market trading rather than the Net
Asset Value (NAV) determines their respective prices. Furthermore, creation and
redemption of shares by specialised dealers allows for arbitrage to restrict diver-
gence from their NAVs, unlike closed ended funds which may exhibit premia or
discounts. In Figure 7 in the appendix it can be seen from the diering sector SP-
DRs that U.S. stocks for all industries were aected during the market downturn.
Interestingly, the decline of the nancial sector (XLF) led that of the others by
approximately 6 months.
Finally, energy futures in the form of crude oil and natural gas contracts are used.
Both follow a similar price evolution, whereby simultaneous peaks are reached in
mid 2008. It is most likely that these patters are driven by both speculation and
high demand from emerging markets until summer 2008, after which the steep fall
in prices can be attributed to collapsing demand as the real economic eects of
8OtC Vol. CtO Vol. OtC Vol. CtO. Vol.
Eurodollar 0.0004 0.0005 Corn 0.0166 0.0132
TNotes 0.0032 0.0022 Cotton 0.0122 0.0121
USDAUD 0.0045 0.0058 Soy Beans 0.0133 0.0107
USDCHF 0.0043 0.0046 XLB 0.0126 0.0077
USDEUR 0.0036 0.0036 XLE 0.0152 0.0090
USDJPY 0.0042 0.0052 XLF 0.0179 0.0130
VIX 0.0652 0.0350 XLI 0.0099 0.0061
Crude 0.0159 0.0105 XLK 0.0113 0.0071
Gas 0.0254 0.0220 XLP 0.0070 0.0040
Gold 0.0104 0.0087 XLU 0.0099 0.0050
Cattle 0.0078 0.0064 XLV 0.0078 0.0043
Table 1: Open-to-Close and Close-to-Open Daily Volatility as measured by the
standard deviations of daily returns.
the crisis spread.
In Table 1 the open-to-close and close-to-open daily volatilities for all respective
variables are reported. First, inspecting the values for the Exchange Traded Funds,
we nd that they are consistent with the existing literature, both in terms of abso-
lute and relative magnitudes. The volatility of the Financial Sector SPDR (XLF)
is greatest, which is to be expected as the sample includes times of nancial market
turbulence. Furthermore, the volatilities of all industries during the open hours of
the exchange are greater than those during the closed period, which is determined
by the distribution of information arrival throughout the day. Concerning the
other asset classes, volatility patterns dier in that the overnight variability as a
percentage of the corresponding open-to-close quantity is signicantly greater. We
believe that there are two reasons for this. Firstly, many of the futures contracts
have shorter trading hours as compared to the ETFs, and secondly, in some cases
the underlying asset is continuously traded for 24 hours. This for instance is the
9case for the FX futures, and where we nd that the overnight volatility exceeds
that of when the U.S. markets are open.
Next, a more detailed data description of the price evolution, as reported by trades,
of the USD-EUR and the Eurodollar futures contracts on a tranquil trading day,
namely November 27th, 2007 is provided. Both markets are open from 7:20 until
14:00 (EST) and 13104 observations for the former and 4914 for the latter are
recorded during this time. In the rst row of Figure 1 the market prices are
reported, whereby the $U.S. marginally devalued against the Euro and the price
of the Eurodollar increased. From the scale it can be seen that the times of the
observations are not uniformly distributed during the day, but rather less trades
were observed around the midday hours. Next, the tick-by-tick price changes are
presented in the center of Figure 1.3 For both securities price movements most
commonly occurred by one tick, with a few exceptions being a 2 tick change at
once. Finally, we provide the corresponding autocorrelation functions for lags 2
through to 100, whereby condence intervals are based on heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors.4 There is some evidence of negative autocorrelation in the data,
which is attributed to market microstructure noise such as the bid/ask bounce.
In what follows this eect is explicitly taken into account when motivating the
econometric methodology.
3The tick size for the USDEUR futures contract is 0.0001, whereas for the Eurodollar it is
0.0025. The reason for the latter is that it is based on 3 month Libor such that this day count
fraction leads to a minimal price movement of 25 $U.S. per 1 million face value.
4The rst lags are omitted for clarity. Their values for both assets are -0.2223 and -0.1868,
respectively.





















































































































































Figure 1: Prices, returns and autocorrelations for the USD-EUR (left column)
and Eurodollar futures contracts (right column) for November 27th, 2007. There
are 13104 observations for the former and 4914 for the latter on this trading day.
The ACF functions are reported for lags 2 through to 100, together with their
respective heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The rst lags for these assets
are -0.2223 and -0.1868, respectively
112.2. Interlinkages between asset classes
This section is concluded by discussing the mechanisms by which linkages between
equity, xed income, commodity and energy markets may have increased during
the nancial crisis. The main argumentation is that these asset classes have become
more interconnected due to increased investor risk aversion, subsequent portfolio
rebalancing and due to excess liquidity which had previously built up in the -
nancial markets, fueled in part by cheap credit and excess leverage. Following the
initial shock to the U.S. subprime mortgage market, investors faced uncertainty
surrounding the valuation of securitised products, exacerbated by downgrades by
rating agencies and a repricing of risk more generally, and thus withdrew funds
from such investments and from the commercial paper markets. Following the
illiquidity of these complex nancial products, a ight to transparency set in, a
result of which the demand for xed income securities such as Treasury notes and
bonds increased, in turn suppressing their respective yields. Presumably, absolute
returns were not central to this behaviour as investors rather sought a storage of
value which insured them against capital losses and allowed for rapid liquidation
in deep markets. This is reected by the sharp increase in the prices of the Eu-
rodollar and the 10 year Treasury notes futures contracts during the second half
of 2007. As market conditions did not improve since the onset of the crisis these
have remained at an elevated level, as illustrated in Figure 5.
Concerning other asset classes, exchange rates exhibited systematic price move-
ments during the nancial crisis. Between the beginning of 2006 and 2008, the
$U.S. continuously depreciated against major currencies such as EUR, JPY, AUD
12and CHF. As market dislocations subsequently spread to these economies during
the second half of 2008, this trend was reversed due to real economic eects and
the resulting narrowing of the interest rate gap as central banks globally slashed
rates towards zero. A further feature of the FX markets during the crisis were
the unwinds of carry trades between high yielding currencies such as the Aus-
tralian Dollar and the Icelandic Krona (ISK), and the Japanese Yen. As investor
risk aversion increased due to the deterioration of the health of the nancial sys-
tem, funds were shifted back into markets which were perceived as being less risky.
As has been widely documented, commodity and energy prices increased signi-
cantly during this recent period of nancial turbulence, before retreating sharply.
Firstly, it has been argued that these asset prices were driven by strong funda-
mentals from emerging markets until the summer of 2008, after which demand
contracted, as the real economic eects of the nancial crisis spread globally. Sec-
ondly, it has been put forward that the rapid price increase and its subsequent
decline have mostly been due to speculative forces, such as hedge funds trading
the respective futures contracts in order to take advantage of the sustained price
dynamics. These price increases are consistent with the aforementioned notion of
portfolio rebalancing and with cross-asset spillovers resulting from excess liquidity
in nancial markets. Due to widespread falling asset prices and the preference for
transparent securities, investment strategies were changed through the purchase
of commodity contracts, independently of economic linkages or fundamentals.
Finally, the impact on U.S. stock markets in the form of Exchange Traded Funds
is analysed. From Figure 7 it follows that these liquid instruments, reecting the
13return on underlying industry indices, initially increased in price and peaked dur-
ing the end of 2007 and beginning of 2008, after which equity markets exhibited
a systematic sell o. Interestingly, the Financial Sector SPDR (XLF) started to
decline by mid 2007, and is subsequently characterised by the greatest percentage
fall whereby values halved by the end of the sample period.
Investor behaviour across all of these dierent asset classes can in part be explained
by repricing of risk in general. In this paper, risk aversion is proxied by the VIX
index, which is a function of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. Dur-
ing times of greatest market uncertainty and when this measure was highest, assets
which were perceived as being most risky were sold, and substituted by securities
with truncated downside risks, as illustrated above.
3 Methodology
In this paper high frequency data is employed to estimate realised volatility and
correlation measures separately for each trading day during the sample window.
To this end the notation and methodology by Barndor-Nielsen et al. (2008a) is
adopted. It is assumed that the variables outlined above follow an n-dimensional
log price process X = (X(1);X(2);:::;X(n))0 on the interval [0,T], where n denotes
the number of assets. Furthermore, the observation times and numbers for asset




2 ;::: and Ni, respectively. The asset price process X is com-
prised of the ecient price Y and market microstructure noise U in the form of
X(t) = Y (t)+U(t), whereby U(t) is due to market illiquidity, inaccurate recording
14or the bid/ask bounce. It is assumed that E(U(t)) = 0, such that the mean of each
element of the n-dimensional U(t) vector is zero. Furthermore, V ar(U(t)) = !2 is
a diagonal nn matrix whereby the assumptions are made the market microstruc-
ture noise is uncorrelated and that its variance is constant across assets and time










where a is a bounded drift,  is a cadlag process and where W is a vector of inde-
pendent Brownian motions, all of which are adapted with regard to the ltration
=. The focus of this paper is the measure of covariation between diering assets
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0 (2)
and where




fY (tj)   Y (tj 1)gfY (tj)   Y (tj 1)g
0; (3)
for 0 = t0 < t1 < :::tN = T with supjftj+1   tjg ! 0 and for N ! 1.5
As a result, (3) is estimated which provides a consistent estimate of [Y ](T) when
using high frequency data. It should be noted though that when making inference
5Importantly, practical implementation of (3) and the estimation of the multivariate kernel
requires that all assets are observed at the same time. Correction for possible non-synchronous
trading is discussed at the end of the methodology section.
15with regard to this expression, biases can arise due to data characteristics. Firstly,
the realised variance (RV) may be overstated as the sampling frequency increases
due to market microstructure noise in the form of the bid/ask bounce. Secondly,
as rst shown by Epps (1979), the realised covariance measure is downward biased
because of non-synchronous trading. As a result, the quantity of interest in this
paper, namely the realised cross-correlation between asset classes, will be severely
skewed towards zero.
In order to overcome this bias diering approaches have been proposed in the
literature. Firstly, Bandi and Russel (2005) determine the optimal sampling fre-
quency. Zhang et al. (2005) introduce the concept of subsampling, whereby the
RV measure is calculated for each possible sparse grid and subsequently averaged.
Finally, Hansen and Lunde (2006) propose the RV AC1 estimator which takes the
negative autocorrelations implied by the bid/ask bounce into account.
In this paper we adopt the multivariate realised kernel put forward by Barndor-
Nielsen et al. (2008a). As in the case of the RV AC1 estimator above, the multi-
variate kernel, which is shown to be positive semi-denite, is of the form of the
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimator as proposed by
Newey and West (1987). Thus the tick-by-tick negative autocorrelation in asset
returns, as described in Figure 1 for the USD-EUR and the Eurodollar contracts,
















and where xj denotes asset returns dened as the rst dierence of the observed
log price process X. The conditions that k(0) = 1 and k0(0) = 0 are required and
imply that the rst few autocovariances receive close to a unit weight. In order to





1   6x2 + 6x3 0 x 1/2
2(1   x)3 1/2 x 1
0 x > 1:
(5)








As discussed above, it is assumed that the price process is dened as X(t) = Y (t)+
U(t) where Y (t) is the ecient price and U(t) denotes the market microstructure
noise. It can be shown that if K(U)
P ! 0 and K(Y )
P ! [Y ](T) then K(X)
P !
[Y ](T), implying that asymptotically independence between U and Y need not be
assumed. In order to take any autocorrelation in the returns into account and
to achieve consistency of the kernel estimator, its optimal bandwidth H which
determines the lag length of the autocovariances, is to be estimated. In this context
Barndor-Nielsen et al. (2008a) show that H _ n3=5 is optimal and that this

























0 k(x)2dx.6 Thus the determination of H involves the estima-
tion of !2 and the integrated quarticity.
A further point of importance are end eects. Asymptotically, the econometric the-
ory of the multivariate realised kernel requires averaging of prices at the beginning
and the end of each trading day due to noise aecting the realised autocovariances
at these limits. This is because K(U)
P ! U2
0 + U2
T 6= 0, implying inconsistency of
the estimator. Dening  U2
0 and  U2
T as the local averages at the beginning and the
end of the trading day, respectively, it can be shown that K(U) =  U2
0 +  U2
T +op(1).
If subsequently ergodicity of the market microstructure noise is assumed in addi-
tion to E(Ut) = 0 it follows that K(U)
P ! 0 such that consistency of the realised
covariance estimator is assured. In this context the local averages of the price












where N is dened as the number of observations. With regard to the optimal
averaging length, a trade-o between accounting for the start and end of trading
day noise, and the loss of information in constructing the kernel estimates arises.
6For the Parzan kernel adopted in this paper this implies that the constant of proportionality
c = ((12)2=(0:269)1=5 = 3:5134. Many thanks to Kevin Sheppard for the estimation procedure,
as proposed Bandi and Russel (2005).
18In practice it has been shown by Barndor-Nielsen et al. (2008b) that when the
magnitude of the quadratic variation vastly exceeds that of  U2
0 +  U2
T, such as in
liquid futures markets, the end eects can be ignored, which is done in this paper.
As previously mentioned, the multivariate realised kernel is motivated due to the
existence of market microstructure noise in the high frequency returns. In the
left column of Figure 2 variance signature plots, as widely seen in the existing
literature for equities, are provided for the Eurodollar and the USD-JPY futures
contracts, whereby (3) is estimated using returns at diering sampling frequen-
cies. These indicate that the realised variance also increases as the time between
observations falls for diering asset classes such as FX and xed income securities
(blue). Furthermore, the variance based on daily open-to-close returns (red) and
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) condence intervals are
reported. In the right column, the realised variance implied by the kernel estimator
is given as a function of the bandwidth H. The average optimal H = c4=5n3=5
for both contracts are 37.1 and 33.9, respectively. At bandwidths above 10 lags,
which with at an average sampling frequency of 10 to 15 seconds imply positive
kernel weights across 2 minutes, most of the negative autocorrelation in the data
has been accounted for. In Figure 3 covariance signature plots for FX, xed in-
come, commodities and energy futures are provided, again based on the estimation
of (3). As argued above, this measure is biased towards zero due to the Epps eect
at higher sampling frequencies, thus underlying the necessity of the multivariate
kernel when calculating realised correlations.
Finally, as mentioned in footnote 5, before estimation of (3) and the kernel based













−7 Eurodollar Realised Variance













−7 Eurodollar Realised Variance









−5 USD−JPY Realised Variance









−5 USD−JPY Realised Variance
Figure 2: Variance signature plots for the Eurodollar and the USD-JPY futures
contracts. In the left column, the realised variance (blue) is provided as a function
of the sampling frequency. Furthermore, the variance from open-to-close daily
returns (red) and 95% HAC condence intervals are reported. As the sampling
frequency increases the market microstructure noise becomes more prominent. In
the right column, the realised variance implied by the kernel estimator is given as
a function of the bandwidth H. The average optimal H = c4=5n3=5 for both
contracts are 37.1 and 33.9, respectively. At small values of the bandwidth, the
autocorrelation in the data is not suciently taken into account.













−7 Eurodollar−TNotes Realised Covariance











−4 Gold−Cotton Realised Covariance









−6 TNotes−USDEUR Realised Covariance






−4 Crude−Gas Realised Covariance
Figure 3: Covariance signature plots for FX, xed income, commodities and energy
futures. As the sampling frequency increases the realised covariances (blue) are
biased towards zero due to the Epps eect. Also, the average covariance based on
open-to-close daily returns (red) and 95% HAC condence intervals are reported.
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Figure 4: Refresh Times for 3 assets
measures can be conducted, the data has to be corrected for non-synchronous
trading, heterogeneous market opening times and missing observations. To this
end Barndor-Nielsen et al. (2008a) introduce the notion of Refresh Time which










). Figure 4 provides an example of this for
the case of 3 assets. The rst Refresh Time 1 is constructed as the time it
takes for all assets to trade once. At 1 the stale prices for assets 1 and 3 are
used in order to form X(1). This procedure is then repeated over [0;T]. In our
analysis, the resulting information loss is potentially severe as certain assets, such
as commodities futures, trade less frequently than the liquid Exchange Traded
Funds. As a result, the construction of the synchronised data sets using Refresh
Times and the estimation of kernel based volatilities and correlations are conducted
in a bivariate fashion.
4 Realised (Kernel Based) Volatility
In this section a rst comprehensive overview of realised kernel based volatility
(KVol hereafter), which is a nonparametric ex-post estimate of the return varia-
tion as dened by K(X) =
Pm
h= m k( h
H+1) h on page 87, across a wide range of
asset classes is provided whilst taking non-synchronous trading and market mi-
22crostructure noise into account. Importantly, as will be evident in what follows,
the respective KVol measures based on the multivariate realised kernel do not in-
crease uniformly across all assets during the nancial crisis.
In Figure 8 the KVol estimates for the xed income securities and FX futures
are provided. With regard to the former, the volatilities of both the Eurodollar
and the 10 year Treasury note contracts approximately double after mid 2007.
This corresponds to the period discussed previously during which the prices for
xed income products increased as investors were seeking safe short run havens
in times of market uncertainty and rising risk aversion. KVol patterns for the
FX futures are not uniform during the crisis but do share some common features.
In terms of the magnitude of the KVol all currency pairs in the sample exhibit
volatility of approximately 0.004 to 0.006. Also, all currencies are aected by the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. More specically, for the
USD-AUD contract KVol doubles rapidly in mid July 2007 and remains elevated
after that. Furthermore, there is a spike in the intra-day volatility on August 17th
2007 which potentially corresponds to the aforementioned unwind of carry trades.
For CHF there is less evidence that volatility increased systematically during the
crisis, as the KVol in mid 2006 was not signicantly lower than during the latter
stages of the sample period. Similar patterns can be observed for the EUR future,
albeit excluding the Lehman Brothers episode. Finally, the KVol measure for the
USD-JPY contract nearly trebles from approximately 0.002 just before the onset
of the crisis. As in the case of the AUD future, this currency pair exhibits a spike
in intra-day volatility on August 17th 2007, which may correspond to the reverse
position of the unwinding carry trades.
23During the nancial crisis the volatility of commodities did not increase homoge-
neously. As can be seen in Figure 9, the KVol measures for the corn, cattle and
cotton futures do not exhibit a systematic rise, except for a large spike in volatility
for the latter on March 3rd 2008. The soy beans contract on the other hand did
become more volatile with KVol doubling at the beginning of 2008. With regard
to gold, there is no evidence of an upward trend in the realised kernel volatility, de-
spite the aforementioned price increase during the crisis to $1000 per ounce around
the time of the Bear Stearns rescue. Noteworthy is the magnitude of the KVol
measure in September 2008 during the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, a time of
heightened risk aversion and subsequent demand for xed income and gold secu-
rities. Finally, in Figure 9, the KVol for the VIX index is presented. Its long run
average remains approximately constant, but the measure exhibits short periods of
increased intra-day volatility. These corresponds to a 25% stock market correction
in Turkey due to repricing of risk and over-dependence on foreign investment in
June 2006, the Shanghai stock market crash in February 2007, the onset of the
subprime crisis in July 2007 and the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008, re-
spectively.
In Figure 10, the realised kernel based volatilities for the Exchange Traded Funds
are provided.7 In accordance with the literature, uncertainty with regard to the
health of the nancial system began to rise after the summer of 2007. During this
7It should be noted that the volatility estimates for the Exchange Traded Funds are of similar
magnitudes as the VIX index in levels in Figure 6. Dierences arise though as the former are
based on historical stock market data, whereas the latter is a function of forward looking implied
volatility from S&P 500 index options.
24time, KVol increased for all industries. As the crisis deepened and solvency issues
became apparent in addition to market and funding illiquidity, volatility increased
further and peaked following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008.
When comparing the KVol measures for diering industries it is to be noted that
the volatility of the Financial Sector SPDR (XLF) is highest and approximately
double compared to that of the Industry (XLI) and Utilities (XLU) Sector SPDRs.
Finally, we present the realised kernel based volatilies of the crude oil and the
natural gas futures in Figure 11. During the time of the sharp rise and subsequent
fall in oil prices in 2008 the volatility showed a slight upward trend increasing
from approximately 0.015 to 0.025. Natural gas on the other hand did not become
systematically more volatile during the crisis.
Using the multivariate realised kernel, this section provided a broad overview of
realised volatility estimates by using high frequency data across diering asset
classes during the global nancial crisis. In this context it is shown that changes
in volatility are not homogenous during this period. Consistent with existing lit-
erature, the KVol measure sharply rises for the Exchange Traded Funds with the
Financial Sector SPDR being most aected. More modest increases are identied
for xed income products. With regard to the FX and commodities contracts nd-
ings are mixed. These results are of importance as they highlight that investors do
not face equal increases in uncertainty across tradable securities, and which will
in turn have an inuence on any optimal (minimal variance) portfolio weights.
255 Realised (Kernel Based) Correlations
As outlined in the introduction, this paper also tests whether during the nancial
crisis new channels of shock transmission emerged and whether unrelated asset
classes co-moved to a greater extent. It has been previously argued that such
process is driven by widespread increases in risk aversion, portfolio reoptimisation
and excess liquidity in nancial markets. From an investors' point of view the
degree the increased correlations across unrelated markets is also of importance in
the context of diversication.
In the data description it was pointed out that the dierent assets in the sample
exhibit heterogeneous market hours despite all exchanges being in the same time
zone. This provides challenges for our analysis of realised cross-correlations as
the construction of the Refresh Times requires simultaneous trading. As a result
the bivariate intersections of these trading hours are constructed for estimation of
the realised kernels, thus implying a degree of information loss. Furthermore, a
downward bias of the correlations may arise if news arrival occurs before markets
open. In this case assets will sequentially react to the new information despite
potentially exhibiting similar price movements due to the event, as result of which
the correlation may underreport the true degree of interdependency across markets.
In Figure 12 the realised kernel based correlations between FX futures are pre-
sented. During the onset of the crisis in the second half of 2007 there are very
pronounced changes in this measure of co-movement, especially amongst those cur-
rency pairs including AUD. As market stress eased at the beginning of 2008 after
26the rescue of Bear Stearns, these relationships seem to normalise, but heightened
interaction is observed again during the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. In 2006
the correlation between the USD-AUD and the USD-JPY FX futures remains at
approximately 0.5 indicating that returns of these currencies are positively related.
By mid 2007 this correlation had dropped to 0, after which this measure falls to
-0.6 during the crisis. This is consistent with the aforementioned unwinding of
carry trades due to increased risk aversion, whereby investors sold high yielding
currencies such as AUD or ISK and ed to JPY and to a lesser extent into CHF.
One further point of interest is that the correlations for all currency pairs begin to
fall around January 2007, which is 6 months prior to the onset of the crisis. Thus
this is evidence that FX pairs may be suitable to develop predictions of future
market dislocations.
The rst examples of realised kernel correlations across diering asset classes,
namely between FX and xed income futures, are provided in Figure 13. Before
the crisis, both the Eurodollar and the 10 year Treasury note contracts were hardly
correlated with the Australian Dollar, with this measure being approximately 0.1.
During the period of nancial turbulence this correlation dropped to -0.2 and -0.4,
respectively, due to increased risk aversion. As investors indiscriminately sold risky
assets, such as high yielding currencies, their portfolios were rebalanced towards
xed income securities. This behaviour is also reected by the increased correla-
tions between the Eurodollar and the Treasury note contracts, and currencies such
as JPY and CHF, whereby this realised measure of co-movement rises from ap-
proximately 0.1 at the beginning of 2006 to between 0.4 and 0.5 for both FX pairs.
Finally, the lower left panel of Figure 13 provides evidence that both xed income
27futures became closer substitutes during the nancial crisis as their correlations
increased in mid 2007. This is consistent with the interpretation that investor
demand for Treasuries was not solely driven by yield or maturity considerations,
but rather these securities were used as a short-run transparent liquidity storage.
Realised correlations between gold, the VIX index and the energy futures are pre-
sented in Figure 14. The former two are both measures of risk aversion and market
uncertainty, as the rst is perceived as being a safe haven during turbulent times
whereas the second is a function of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options.
From the top left panel it can be seen that in 2008 the correlation between these
two measures increases to about 0.2, implying that during times of increased stock
market volatility the gold price rises. The other plots in Figure 14 are consistent
with the notion of asset prices being driven by excess liquidity and portfolio re-
optimisation during the crisis. For example, the energy contracts of crude oil and
natural gas have become highly correlated with gold and the VIX index. Thus,
as market conditions deteriorated and gold prices and risk aversion rose, investors
also continuously drove up energy prices, despite the real negative eects of the
nancial crisis on the world economy.
Next, the correlations between between energy futures and stock prices in the
form of the Exchange Traded Funds are described and it is shown that these ef-
fects are not homogenous across diering industries. More specically, the realised
correlation between natural gas and the Energy Sector SPDR (XLE) is positive
throughout the sample period, increasing from 0.2 before the crisis to 0.4. This
is contrasted by the degree of co-movement between crude oil and the Industry
28Sector SPDR (XLI), for instance. Before the nancial crisis these two asset classes
are uncorrelated, but in 2008 this realised measure falls to -0.4. This in turn im-
plies that as the dislocations of nancial markets deepened and real eects spread,
increases in energy prices became associated with falls in industrial stocks. Similar
heterogeneity in the correlations can be found between gold and the diering in-
dustries. For example, the XLE SPDR becomes increasingly more correlated with
this proxy of risk aversion, whereas this relationship with XLI turns negative dur-
ing the crisis, being consistent with investors liquidating cyclical industrial stocks
and buying gold. Concerning the relationship between the VIX index and the
Exchange Traded Funds, as expected, it is found that the Financial Sector SPDR
(XLF) is highly negatively correlated with the former, whereas this relationship is
not as strong in the case of the Utilities Sector SPDR (XLU).
Finally, in the left column of Figure 16 realised correlations amongst Exchange
Traded Funds are provided. During the nancial crisis the interdependencies be-
tween the individual sectors have grown, a result which is consistent with existing
literature. In the right column, the correlations amongst a subset of commodities
are presented. Interestingly, despite simultaneous price increases for cattle, corn,
cotton and soy beans, we nd absolutely no evidence that these futures have be-
come more correlated with each other or with any of the other assets.
This section presented results with regard to realised kernel based correlations be-
tween diering asset classes. We nd that the co-movements between FX pairs
changed approximately 6 months prior to those of all other variables and before
the onset of the subprime crisis. This would indicate that it is potentially possible
29to use these measures as an early indicator of future market dislocations. Further-
more, we provide evidence that xed income securities became more correlated,
in absolute value, with both high and low yielding currencies. Interdependence
between risk aversion measures such as the VIX index and gold with energy also
became more pronounced during the nancial crisis. Finally, it is shown that, de-
spite simultaneous increases in the price levels of commodities, their co-movement
amongst themselves and with other securities did not increase. With regard to
interpretation of these results, we believe that these ndings are consistent with
the notion that prices became more heavily interrelated during the crisis due to
excess liquidity, heightened risk aversion and portfolio rebalancing.
6 GARCH Modeling
In this nal section the estimates from the multivariate realised kernel are com-
bined with daily data and modelled within a multivariate GARCH framework.
Examples of this can be found in Engle and Gallo (2003) who extend the Multi-
plicative Error Model (MEM) by including exogenous regressors such as realised
volatility, absolute returns and the daily high-low range in the conditional variance
of asset returns. Incorporating realised measures in this way allows for exploitation
of additional intra-day information and it is subsequently shown that out-of-sample
forecasting performance of this model class can be improved.
In this paper, the same methodology as in Barndor-Nielsen et al. (2008a) is
adopted, where a scalar BEKK model, as initially proposed by Engle and Kroner
(1995), is amended to include realised estimates of the implied covariance matrix
30as exogenous regressors. As their analysis is conducted for stocks, we are able to
build on this seminal work by comparing their results with those of diering asset
classes, such as FX, xed income, commodity and energy securities.
In addition to the kernel estimate of the covariance matrix as described through-
out, a further one based on 5 minute asset returns is included in the multivariate
GARCH model. Recalling earlier methodological discussion, it was argued that
biases may arise when calculating (3), which in turn motivated the adoption of
the multivariate realised kernel. More specically, it was pointed out that as the
sampling frequency increases the RV measure exhibits an upward bias due to mar-
ket microstructure noise such as the bid/ask bounce, whereas the opposite is true
for the realised covariance due to the Epps eect. In Figures 2 and 3 we showed
that this phenomenon, which has been observed in the literature, also holds for a
wide range of asset classes. As a result, the 'naive' estimation of (3) is conducted
using 5 minute returns, such as to avoid these issues arising due to high sampling
frequencies.
Following Barndor-Nielsen et al. (2008a) multivariate GARCH models are es-
timated whereby daily returns, constructed from closing prices, are mean zero
E(rtj=HF
t 1) = 0 and where the conditional variance is specied as Cov(rtj=HF
t 1) =
Ht. =HF
t 1 denotes the high frequency information set and thus includes the lagged
realised kernel covariance Kt 1 and that based on 5 minutes returns RCov5m
t 1.




t 1 + Ht 1 (8)
Ht = C














t 1 + Ht 1 + Kt 1 + RCov
5m
t 1 (12)
In Tables 2 and 3 the results are presented for a subset of Exchange Traded Funds,
FX, xed income, commodity and energy securities. It should be noted that both
realised measures do not include overnight eects, unlike the daily returns, in
explaining the conditional variance. As a general pattern it is found that the in-
clusion of the realised covariances reduces the  and  terms in the scalar BEKK
models, whilst respective coecients of between 0.1 and 0.4 are attributed to the
kernel and the 5 minutes covariance estimates. Based on the log-likelihood values
of nested specications, it follows that the standard scalar BEKK model (8) is
rejected for most assets in favour of one incorporating intra-day information such
as (10) and (11).
Barndor-Nielsen et al. (2008a) provide very similar ndings for stocks, both in
terms of magnitudes of coecients and model selection. As a result we conclude
that the inclusion of realised measures increases the explanatory power of models
for a wider range of underlying asset classes and may be of use in developing more
precise volatility forecasts.
32Asset Class Ht 1 rt 1r0
t 1 Kt 1 RV 5m
t 1 logL
AUD-CHF 0.8577 0.0168 0.1165 - 7254.2
(0.0399) (0.0121) (0.0366)
0.8394 0.0219 - 0.1180 7254.5
(0.0498) (0.0127) (0.0408)
0.9466 0.0530 - - 7231.7
(0.0114) (0.0097)
0.8505 - 0.1373 - 7253.2
(0.0414) (0.0371)
0.8344 - 0.0832 0.0627 7253.7
(0.0518) (0.0629) (0.0674)
AUD-JPY 0.8802 0.03311 0.08339 - 7230.2
(0.0216) (0.0129) (0.0231)
0.8832 0.0373 - 0.0718 7229.5
(0.0217) (0.0126) (0.0210)
0.9316 0.0701 - - 7214.9
(0.0108) (0.0106)
0.8629 - 0.1266 - 7226.8
(0.0236) (0.0231)
0.8615 - 0.1044 0.0223 7226.8
(0.0244) (0.0556) (0.0521)
AUD-TN 0.9118 0.0153 0.0693 - 7205.3
(0.0263) (0.0107) (0.0258)
0.9057 0.0169 - 0.0737 7207.6
(0.0227) (0.0112) (0.0230)
0.9511 0.0487 - - 7190.4
(0.0124) (0.0097)
0.9031 - 0.0913 - 7204.3
(0.0283) (0.0247)
0.9007 - 0.000 0.0870 7207.1
(0.0228) (0.0395) (0.0399)
Cattle-Corn 0.8448 0.0047 0.1575 - 5436.1
(0.0736) (0.0127) (0.0775)
0.9222 0.000 - 0.0638 5437.4
(0.0270) (0.0096) (0.0226)
0.9533 0.0232 - - 5428.1
(0.0166) (0.0070)
0.8351 - 0.1738 - 5436.1
(0.0712) (0.0679)
0.8924 - 0.0562 0.0501 5438.8
(0.0486) (0.0487) (0.02153)
Table 2: Bivariate Scalar BEKK Models for Selected Asset Classes
33Asset Class Ht 1 rt 1r0
t 1 Kt 1 RV 5m
t 1 logL
Cotton-Soy 0.9640 0.0236 0.0070 - 5346.2
(0.0127) (0.0064) (0.0075)
0.9565 0.0224 - 0.0083 5347.5
(0.0180) (0.0067) (0.0065)
0.9678 0.0245 - - 5345.7
(0.0104) (0.0061)
0.9312 - 0.0651 - 5327.8
(0.0229) (0.0205)
0.8824 - 0.0000 0.0593 5339.6
(0.0502) (0.0268) (0.0276)
Gold-Crude 0.8748 0.0149 0.1330 - 5432.5
(0.0451) (0.0120) (0.0558)
0.8328 0.0000 - 0.1373 5442.8
(0.0441) (0.0145) (0.0388)
0.9623 0.0333 - - 5422.4
(0.0083) (0.0064)
0.8552 - 0.1738 - 5431.8
(0.0409) (0.0468)
0.8329 - 0.0000 0.1373 5442.8
(0.0444) (0.0540) (0.0451)
Gold-Gas 0.8249 0.0000 0.2086 - 5080.7
(0.0452) (0.0143) (0.0568)
0.7358 0.0000 - 0.2128 5088.5
(0.0942) (0.0190) (0.0691)
0.9475 0.0421 - - 5056.5
(0.0112) (0.0085)
0.8249 - 0.2086 - 5080.7
(0.0451) (0.0527)
0.7358 - 0.000 0.2128 5088.5
(0.0897) (0.0853) (0.0902)
XLK-XLF 0.6476 0.0049 0.4058 - 5900.5
(0.0685) (0.0061) (0.07543)
0.5802 0.000 - 0.4144 5896.8
(0.0833) (0.000) (0.0854)
0.8972 0.1136 - - 5801.3
(0.0123) (0.1042)
0.6937 - 0.3608 - 5900.1
(0.0343) (0.0445)
0.6244 - 0.2746 0.1389 5901.9
(0.0686) (0.0727) (0.08791)
Table 3: Bivariate Scalar BEKK Models for Selected Asset Classes
347 Conclusion
In this paper the existing empirical literature on the current nancial crisis is ex-
tended. First, using high frequency data across a wide range of asset classes, we
provide an analysis of realised kernel based volatility of Exchange Traded Funds,
FX, xed income, commodity and energy securities, whilst accounting for market
microstructure noise and non-synchronous trading. Second, changes in interde-
pendencies between these distinct markets are quantied and it is shown that
correlations increased during periods of heightened market dislocations.
More specically, it is found that the co-movements between FX pairs changed ap-
proximately 6 months prior to the onset of the subprime crisis, which is believed
to be driven by the unwinding of carry trades. This also suggests that these assets
may be utilitsed in constructing predictors of future nancial turbulence.
Furthermore, xed income securities became more correlated, in absolute value,
with both high and low yielding currencies. Interdependence between risk aver-
sion measures such as the VIX index and gold with energy also became more
pronounced during the nancial crisis. Finally, it is shown that, despite simul-
taneous increases in the price levels of commodities, their comovement amongst
themselves and with other securities did not increase. With regard to interpreta-
tion of these results, we believe that this is consistent with the notion that prices
became more heavily interrelated during the crisis due to excess liquidity, height-
ened risk aversion and portfolio rebalancing.
35Finally, we build on existing work by combining realised covariance estimates with
daily data. In this context it is shown that their inclusion within a multivariate
GARCH framework may increase the explanatory power of volatility models and
we extend these existing ndings for stock market securities to cover other asset
classes.
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39Asset Abbreviation Trading Market Data Source
Eurodollar Futures Eurodollar CME TickData
Treasury Notes Futures TNotes CBOT TickData
Australian Dollar Futures USDAUD CME TickData
Swiss Franc Futures USDCHF CME TickData
Euro Futures USDEUR CME TickData
Japanese Yen Futures USDJPY CME TickData
VIX Index VIX CBOE TickData
Crude Oil Futures Crude NYMEX TickData
Natural Gas Futures Gas NYMEX TickData
Gold Futures Gold NYMEX TickData
Live Cattle Futures Cattle CME TickData
Corn Futures Corn CME TickData
Cotton Futures Cotton NYBOT TickData
Soy Beans Futures Soy Beans CME TickData
Materials SPDR XLB NYSE Taq Data
Energy SPDR XLE NYSE Taq Data
Finance SPDR XLF NYSE Taq Data
Industrials SPDR XLI NYSE Taq Data
Technology SPDR XLK NYSE Taq Data
Consumer Staples SPDR XLP NYSE Taq Data
Utilities SPDR XLU NYSE Taq Data
Health Care SPDR XLV NYSE Taq Data
Table 4: CME = Chicago Mercantile Exchange, CBOT = Chicago Board of Trade,
CBOE = Chicago Board of Options Exchange, NYMEX = NY Mercantile Ex-
change, NYBOT = NY Board of Trade, NYSE = NY Stock Exchange
























































Figure 5: Fixed Income Securities, FX, Commodities and ETFs



































































Figure 6: Fixed Income Securities, FX, Commodities and ETFs


























































Figure 7: Fixed Income Securities, FX, Commodities and ETFs








−3 Eurodollar Realised Volatility














































Figure 8: Realised Volatility for Fixed Income and FX Futures




































Soy Beans Realised Volatility






























Figure 9: Realised Volatility for Commodities Futures





































































Figure 10: Realised Volatility for Exchange Traded Funds




















Figure 11: Realised Volatility for Energy Futures












Realised Correlation − USDAUS/USDCHF












Realised Correlation − USDAUS/USDEUR









Realised Correlation − USDAUD/USDJPY








Realised Correlation − USDCHF/USDEUR











Realised Correlation − USDCHF/USDJPY









Realised Correlation − USDEUR/USDJPY
Figure 12: Realised Correlations for FX Futures (blue); 10 Day Moving Average
(red)







Realised Correlation − Eurodollar/USDAUD








Realised Correlation − Tnotes/USDAUD








Realised Correlation − Eurodollar/USDJPY












Realised Correlation − TNotes/USDJPY








Realised Correlation − Eurodollar/TNotes








Realised Correlation − Tnotes/USDCHF
Figure 13: Realised Correlations for Fixed Income and FX Futures (blue); 10 Day
Moving Average (red)











Realised Correlation − VIX/Gold







Realised Correlation − Crude/Gas










Realised Correlation − Crude/Gold










Realised Correlation − Gas/Gold







Realised Correlation − VIX/Crude









Realised Correlation − VIX/Gas
Figure 14: Realised Correlations for VIX, Gold and Energy (blue); 10 Day Moving
Average (red)










Realised Correlation − Gas/XLE












Realised Correlation − Crude/XLI











Realised Correlation − Gold/XLE








Realised Correlation − VIX/XLF












Realised Correlation − Gold/XLI








Realised Correlation − VIX/XLU
Figure 15: Realised Correlations for VIX, Gold, Energy and ETFs (blue); 10 Day
Moving Average (red)












Realised Correlation − XLB/XLE










Realised Correlation − Cattle/Corn









Realised Correlation − XLF/XLI








Realised Correlation − Cotton/Soy Beans










Realised Correlation − XLI/XLK








Realised Correlation − VIX/Cattle
Figure 16: Realised Correlations for ETFs and Commodities (blue); 10 Day Mov-
ing Average (red)
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